Joachim Peiper

 

Mugshot of Obersturmbannfurher
Joachim Peiper from the Malmedy Massacre trial,
where he was convicted of war crimes and sentenced
to death, 1946. Peiper's sentence was commuted to
35 years in 1954, and he was released on parole at
the end of December 1956, after serving 11 and a
half years. He was killed at his home in Traves,
France, in 1976.

SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper was a heavily armored task
force of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte.
Named after its commander, Joachim Peiper, it was
charged with spearheading the 6th Panzer Army on
the northern sector during the Battle of the Bulge.

Kampfgruppe Peiper committed a series of war
crimes and atrocities against American prisoners of
war and Belgian civilians during the Battle of the
Bulge, including the infamous Malmedy Massacre.

On 17th December 1944, about 120 American troops
from the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion
were surprised by the advancing Peiper's units at the
Baugnez crossroads near Malmedy in Belgium. Along
with other American prisoners of war captured earlier
they were led into a meadow, lined up and
machine-gunned.

A few managed to escape to a café at the
crossroads. The SS soldiers set fire to the building
and shot all who tried to escape the flames. 84
American POWs were massacred, and their bodies
were left in the snow. The atrocities of Peiper's men
conflnued.

In Honsfeld, they forced the Americans to fuel their
vehicles and then shot them down in cold blood.
POWs and civilians were murdered in Bullingen,
Ligneuville, Stavelot, Cheneux, La Gleize and Wereth
At least 373 American POWs and 111 Belgian
civilians were killed by Kampfgruppe Peiper.

News of the Malmedy and other massacres spread
quickly throughout American ranks, causing great
anger and desire to retaliate. It only stiffened their
resistance, as troops became determined to hold the
lines against the German advance until
reinforcements could arrive, in particular the 101st
Airborne Division's defense of Bastogne.

Regarding Peiper's death, he was
recognized by former French Resistance fighters
nearly 30 years after WW2. Peiper died on
Bastille Day, 1976, after his home was attacked
and set on fire.

Erich von Manstein

 

 

 

Outstanding among the younger leaders was Erich von Manstein,
who was born on Lewinslki, son of a distinguished army oflicer, but
was later adopted by his mothers brother-in-law, General von Manstein,
an equally distinguished soldier. As a junior officer in World War 1, young .
Manstein served with distinction on the Western, Eastem, and Serbian fronts,
and was badly wounded. Between the wars his brilliance caused him to
he promoted to majorgeneral, and deputy to the Chief of the German General
 Staff.

Although he was in disfavor with Hitler at the outbreak of World War II,
Manstein became chief of staff to von Rundstedt, who commanded the
Southern  Army Group in the Battle of Poland. He was still Rundstedt's
chief of staff in 1939-40, when the latter was appointed to command Army
Group A for the invasion of Western Europe.

It was at this time that .Manstein's strategic brilliance first had a major

influence on the war. He was very dissatisfied with theoriginal plan of
Hitler and von Brauchitsch, which he felt was amere imitation of the
Schlieffen Plan, by which Germany had almost won World War I. He
believed that the Allies would be ready for such a plan, which could
thus achieve only a partial victory in Holland and Belgium. With the
strong support of von Rundstedt, he proposed instead a powerful
surprise thrust through the Ardennes and northern France to the
 English Channel, thus isolating and destroying the left-flank Allied
armies, and making it easy to overwhelm France with one more blow.
Hitler, having heard minors of a strategic controversy, sent for Manstein,
and after hearing his opinion, revised the plan, which soon afterward
worked out exactly as Manstein had envisaged.

Manstein commanded an infantry corps in the operations in Western Europe,
and led an armored corps in the initial invasionof Russia. His brilliance led
to his promotion to command of the  Eleventh Army, with which he conquered
the Crimea and (in July,1942) Sevastopol. His outstanding success in these
operations (while the rest of the German army had been thrown back from
Moscow and Leningrad) led to his promotion to Field Marshal. After briefly
commanding the Northern Army Group, near Leningrad, late in 1942 Manstein
was rushed to take command of the newly created Don Army Group, for the
purpose of attempting the relief of the German forces cut off in Stalingrad.
His slashing counterattacks would have been successful if Hitler had allowed  
General von Paulus to fight his way out to meet Manstein. But Hitler insisted
that all ground be held, and thus doomed von Paulus’ Sixth Army to destruction.
Not only did Manstein completely stop the Russian counter-offensive from Stalingrad,
but in March, 1943, despite great Russian numerical superiority, he counterattacked
in turn to win a victory in the Battle of Kharkov. This was the last important
German victory of World War II.

During the remainder of 1943 and early 1944, Manstein commanded the Southern
Army Group against the principal Russian offensives in the Ukraine. Although the
Russian forces outnumbered his own by four- or five-to-one during this period,
Manstein's brilliant withdrawals and counterattacks miraculously prevented
a Russian breakthrough, and resulted in far heavier Russian casualties than those
his own forces suffered. Hitler, however, refused to adopt his repeated recommendations
for a further withdrawal, to shorter and more easily defended lines, where Manstein
envisaged a showdown battle to knock Russia out of the war, or at least to
gain a stalemate in the East. Hitler was infuriated by Mansteirfs obvious contempt
for his military blunders, and in March, 1944, relieved him from command.
Mianstein took no further part in the war.

Manstein never exercised strategic command over an independent theater of
operations, although he commanded about one quarter of the vast Russian front.
For four and a half years, however, he demonstrated strategic, tactical, and administrative
capabilities of the highest order, and seems to have had an inherent
military genius unexcelled in Germany, and comparable to that of MacArthur.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Field Marshal Walter Model

 Walter Model liked to call himself “the F iihrer's fireman.” He proved
his capability to put out apparently unquenchable fires on many occasions.
He first came to Hitler's attention as a brilliant staff officer just
before the war. He showed his command ability by leading a panzer
division in the invasion of Russia. By early 1942 he had been promoted
to the command of an army, and continued to distinguish himself on
attack and in the defense.

Model lacked Manstein’s keen strategic genius, but was one of Germany’s
finest tacticians during the war. Even before Manstein was relieved,
Hitler had begun to use Model to take command of diflicult spots. Late
in 1943 he was promoted to command Army Group North, and checked the
Russian winter offensive toward the Baltic States. After the relief of
Manstein, Zhukov took advantage of the situation to break through the
front of Army Group South; Model was rushed to the front, and miraculously
plugged the hole and stopped the Russian drive. W’hen the Russians then
broke through north of the Pripet Marshes and headed toward Warsaw, Model
was again shifted, and again stopped the Russian advance.

Then, with the Western Front splitting apart, as the Americans and British
smashed their way out of the Normandy beachhead, Hitler called on Model to
take command in the West and to perform another miracle — which he did.
‘With the German armies apparently completely smashed in France, Model
nonetheless succeeded in establishing a new and firrn defensive line in Belgium
and eastern France. Later, with Rundstedt recalled to command in the West, Model,
commanding Army Group B, continued his brilliant defensive tactics in the bitter
winter months of battles in Belgium and the Rhineland.

Although Model was always loyal to Hitler, he was never a spineless “yes-man.”
He was one of the few soldiers who could give his frank opinions to the dictator.
Hitler took this from middle-class Model, while he would never take it from
equally outspoken aristocratic officers like Manstein and Rundstedt. When
he thought Hitler would refuse to permit withdrawals, Model simply acted, and
informed the High Command afterward. He maintained this independence of mind
to the very end; when resistance was hopeless in the Ruhr pocket, despite
Hitler’s orders to continue to fight, he ordered his troops to surrender, and
then committed suicide.

Germany's leading Panzer commander was Heinz Guderian, an outspoken tank force
soldier who did much to build up Germans armored strength before the war, and
who was in large part responsible for developing the armored role in blitzkrieg
tactics. He performed well in the command of large armored units in the invasions
of Poland, France, and Russia. In the latter invasion he bitterly protested Hitler’s
diversion of his tank units from the drive on Moscow to the Kiev encirelement.
Formerly a favorite of Hitler, his outspoken expression of opinion at this time,
followed by the later failure of his tanks to take Moscow, in December, led to
his abrupt dismissal from command.

In March, 1943, however, Guderian was called back as Inspector General of Panzer
troops, and was appointed acting Chief of Staff of the army in ]uly, 1944, following
the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler. He was relieved again, following
an argument with Hitler, in March, 1945. Lacking the spark of exceptional genius of a
Manstein or a Rommel, Guderian was,nonetheless, one of the finest fighting soldiers of
the war; a worthy counter part of Americas Patton.

 

 

German Commander :- Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt

 

 Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt came from a noble Prussian
family. Retired from active duty in late 1938, he was recalled in
1939 to command the Southern Army Group in the campaign
against Poland. The following year his Army Group A played the
principal role in the invasion of the West. For the invasion of
Russia he commanded the Southern Army Group, which made the
deepest and most spectacular advances into Russia.

   In November, 1941, finding himself in complete disagreement
with Hitler on the plans for a winter campaign, and with his rec-
ommendations ignored, Rundstedt resigned his command. In July,
1942, however, Hitler recalled him as Commander in Chief West,
responsible for all German forces in France and the Low Countries.
He retained his post until early July, 1944, shortly after the Allied
breakout from the Normandy beachhead. It is reported that Hitler
telephoned Rundstedt at his headquarters in Paris, asl-ting advice.
Rundstedt is supposed to have replied: "Make peace, you fool!”
He was immediately relieved of his command, and replaced by von
Kluge, who in tum was soon replaced by Model.
Yet, strangely, Hitler recalled Rundstedt to the same command
a few months later, in September, after Model had stabilized the
front in the West. Apparently Hitler felt that Rundstedt’s presence
would be reassuring to the tradition-minded officers of the army.

  Rundstedt had, in fact, really ended his active military career
when he gave up his command in Russia. He was merely a figure-
head in both of his two periods of command in the West. This was
partly due to the fact that Hitler never gave him the full authority
that went with his title of Commander in Chief, and partly because
the old soldier had lost the vigor and mental flexibility he had dis-
played in Poland and France. Beloved, respected, and trusted by
his ofiicers, Rundstedt was a model of the traditional Prussian
officer. And though he made clear that he detested Hitler, he was
also a model to most German oflicers in tolerating the continued
tyranny of the Nazi dictator, and in allowing Hitler to ruin completely
the country which they loved.